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Background:  During  2005–2012,  surveillance  in Maela  refugee  camp,  Thailand,  identiﬁed  four  cholera
outbreaks,  with  rates  up to 10.7  cases  per  1000  refugees.  In  2013,  the  Thailand  Ministry  of  Public  Health
sponsored  a two-dose  oral  cholera  vaccine  (OCV)  campaign  for  the  approximately  46,000  refugees  living
in Maela.
Methods:  We enumerated  the target  population  (refugees  living  in  Maela  who  are  ≥1 year old  and  not
pregnant)  in  a census  three  months  before  the  campaign  and  issued  barcoded  OCV  cards  to each  indi-
vidual.  We  conducted  the campaign  using  a ﬁxed-post  strategy  during  two  eight-day  rounds  plus  one
two-day  round  for  persons  who  had  missed  their second  dose  and  recorded  vaccine  status  for  each  indi-
vidual.  To  identify  factors  associated  with  no  vaccination  (versus  at least  one  dose)  and  those  associated
with  adverse  events  following  immunization  (AEFI),  we used  separate  marginal  log-binomial  regression
models  with  robust  variance  estimates  to account  for household  clustering.
Results:  A  total  of 63,057  OCV  doses  were  administered  to a target  population  of 43,485  refugees.  An
estimated  35,399  (81%)  refugees  received  at least  one  dose and  27,658  (64%)  received  two  doses.  A total  of
993 additional  doses  (1.5%)  were  wasted  including  297  that were  spat  out.  Only  0.05%  of refugees,  mostly
children,  could  not  be vaccinated  due  to repeated  spitting.  Characteristics  associated  with  no  vaccination
(versus  at  least  one  dose)  included  age ≥15  years  (versus  1–14 years),  Karen  ethnicity  (versus  any  other
ethnicity)  and,  only  among  adults  15–64  years  old,  male sex.  Passive  surveillance  identiﬁed  84  refugees
who  experienced  108  AEFI  including  three  serious  but  coincidental  events.  The  most  frequent  AEFI  were
nausea  (49%),  dizziness  (38%),  and  fever  (30%).  Overall,  AEFI  were  more  prevalent  among  young  children
and older  adults.
Conclusions:  Our  results  suggest  that  mass  vaccination  in refugee  camps  with  a  two-dose  OCV  is readily
achievable  and  AEFI  are  few.
evierPublished  by ElsAbbreviations: PU—AMI, Première Urgence—Aide Médicale Internationale;
OPH, Ministry of Public Health; CDC, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
ention.
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1. Introduction
Exclusive use of clean drinking water and good sanitation and
hygiene are the most effective means of preventing epidemic
cholera and many other diseases, yet these basic measures are still
deﬁcient in many places. Some public health authorities have pro-
posed the use of oral cholera vaccine (OCV) as a complementary
measure in areas at risk for cholera [1,2]. A whole-cell killed OCV
with recombinant cholera toxin B subunit, Dukoral® (Crucell/SBL
Vaccine, Sweden), has been available for more than two decades but
at a prohibitive price for mass vaccination in resource-constrained
D license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ettings. A less expensive, more easily administered, and simi-
arly constituted OCV (minus the B subunit), ShancholTM (Shantha
iotechnics, India), was licensed for the ﬁrst time in India in 2009
nd prequaliﬁed by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2011,
ringing at the time more attention and debate to the public health
ole of cholera vaccination [3].
Refugee camps, often overcrowded, are vulnerable to epidemic
holera when environmental conditions are unsanitary [4–6].
hese conditions are more commonly seen in crisis situations but
an also occur in established camps. Maela refugee camp, created
n 1984 in northern Thailand, is one such long-standing yet vul-
erable camp. Maela provides shelter for approximately 46,000
redominately Karen refugees from Burma and has experienced
ecurring cholera outbreaks since at least 2005 (data for prior years
re not available). Maela is administered by the Royal Thai Govern-
ent’s Ministry of Interior, while international non-governmental
rganizations (NGOs) provide essential services. The NGO Première
rgence—Aide Médicale Internationale (PU—AMI) has provided
ealth services since 2005. In 2013, the Thailand Ministry of Public
ealth (MOPH) sponsored a two-dose ShancholTM OCV campaign,
artnering with PU—AMI and the U.S. Centers for Disease Con-
rol and Prevention (CDC) for implementation and evaluation. We
eview the history of cholera in Maela and describe the cam-
aign including estimated coverage, factors associated with vaccine
ptake, vaccine wastage, adverse events following immunization
AEFI), and factors associated with AEFI.
. Methods
.1. Cholera surveillance review
We  reviewed PU—AMI cholera surveillance data from 2005
hrough 2012. From 2008 through 2012, all patients seeking care for
cute watery diarrhea with moderate or severe dehydration dur-
ng a conﬁrmed outbreak received conﬁrmatory testing (isolation of
oxigenic Vibrio cholerae O1); before 2008, during a conﬁrmed out-
reak, some patients were presumptively diagnosed. Conﬁrmatory
esting was performed by a government hospital using Cary-Blair
edia for transport and thiosulfate citrate bile salts sucrose agar
or isolation. Suspected V. cholerae colonies were tested by slide
gglutination with speciﬁc monoclonal antibodies to identify the
erogroup (O1 or O139) and serotype (Ogawa or Inaba).
.2. Pre-campaign information, education, and communication
ctivities
In the months leading up to the campaign, PU—AMI began pro-
iding information about cholera, prevention, and vaccination in
eetings with camp-based governance committees, religious and
ivic leaders, and school principals and teachers. These leaders
n turn informed their constituencies through town hall meet-
ngs, the camp newsletter, and informal communications. Social
obilization also included personal communications by PU—AMI
ommunity health workers during routine home visits. Other
ommunications included classroom presentations, posters, and
eminders via loudspeaker on the days leading up to the campaign.
.3. Census and vaccine cards
PU—AMI conducted a pre-campaign census in
ctober–November 2012, three months before the start of
he vaccine campaign. Census workers, themselves refugees living
n Maela, administered a standard questionnaire to one adult (≥18
ears) member of each household and cross-checked demographic
ata with household food ration books. The census questionnaire
ollected individual-level data on name, sex, age, ethnicity, and34 (2016) 128–133 129
length of residency in Maela and household-level information on
environmental and behavioral characteristics related to water,
sanitation, and hygiene. Upon completion, PU—AMI distributed
barcoded OCV cards to each person identiﬁed in the census.
2.4. Campaign strategy
PU—AMI conducted the campaign in two rounds open to all eli-
gible refugees plus a third, shorter round for refugees who had
already received their ﬁrst, but not their second, dose. The rounds
took place two weeks apart in January, February, and March 2013,
before the start of the rainy season. PU—AMI used a ﬁxed-post
strategy plus mobile teams (who offered vaccine to house-bound
refugees, hospital inpatients, and children at some schools). The
ﬁrst two rounds lasted eight days each. The third round lasted two
days.
Each post was staffed by 20–25 workers. Entry screeners
obtained consent (verbally as illiteracy is high), screened for the
excluded conditions of pregnancy (by self-report) or age <1 year,
and scanned OCV cards or issued temporary cards. Vaccinators
opened each vaccination vial, ensured the entire dose was  con-
sumed, and offered a second dose (but not a third dose) in the
case of spitting or vomiting. Exit controllers marked the back of
the hand of the vaccinated with indelible markers in order to avoid
inadvertent revaccination during a single round. After ingesting the
vaccine, water was  offered for the vaccinees’ comfort and to reduce
spitting. In response to frequent complaints about taste, PU—AMI
ﬂavored the water with syrup to help wash away the taste.
2.5. Vaccine registry
For refugees who  sought vaccination and brought their barcoded
OCV cards to the campaign, staff scanned the card to record date,
time, and vaccine status for each refugee. For refugees who came
without their OCV cards and refugees who  were vaccinated off-
site by mobile teams, staff issued temporary cards to capture this
information. After the campaign, PU—AMI attempted to ﬁnd each
temporary cardholder in the census database, matching by name,
date of birth or age, sex, address, and ration book number. Tem-
porary cards that could not be matched were accounted for during
statistical analysis as described below.
2.6. Adverse events following immunization
To detect AEFI on campaign days, staff encouraged refugees to
wait in a designated area for 30 min  immediately after ingesting
the vaccine. Staff observed refugees and notiﬁed medics when AEFI
occurred. Medics at camp clinics monitored inpatient and outpa-
tient admissions for AEFI from the ﬁrst day of each round through 14
days after the last day for a given round. All serious adverse events
were investigated to assess a causal relationship with vaccination.
2.7. Statistical analysis
Because we determined ﬁrst versus second dose according to the
date of vaccination as recorded on OCV cards and temporary cards,
the failure to identify some temporary cardholders in the census
database introduced uncertainty into our estimate of vaccine cov-
erage. For example, if a refugee was  vaccinated during round two,
received a temporary card, and could not be matched to a per-
son in the census database, then we  do not know whether that
round two dose was  a ﬁrst dose (refugee did not attend round one)
or a second dose (refugee brought an OCV card to round one but
not round two). To account for this uncertainty, we  calculated the
minimum and maximum vaccine coverage statistics according to
two different assumptions:
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Fig. 1. Seven-day moving average of cholera case (conﬁrmed or presumed) counts
for  years when outbreaks occurred. (No cholera cases were detected in 2006, 2009,
2011, or 2012).
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ssumption A. All refugees with only one documented dose truly
eceived only that dose, regardless of the round during which it was
eceived.
ssumption B. When refugees with only one documented dose
eceived that dose during round two or three, the dose received
as truly a second dose.
For the ﬁrst dose coverage statistics, the maximum was calcu-
ated by including all those with at least one documented dose,
egardless of round (Assumption A); the minimum was calculated
y excluding those refugees with one documented dose when that
ose was received during round two or three (Assumption B). For
he second dose coverage statistics, the maximum was calculated
y including all who received two documented doses plus all who
eceived a single dose during round two or three, even when a ﬁrst
ose was not documented (Assumption B); the minimum was  cal-
ulated by excluding those with only one documented dose, even
hen received during round two or three (Assumption A). We  chose
he midpoint as the best estimate of coverage.
To identify factors associated with no vaccination (versus
eceipt of at least one dose) and those associated with AEFI, we
alculated prevalence ratios (PR) and 95% conﬁdence intervals
CI) using separate marginal log-binomial regression models with
obust variance estimates to account for clustering by household.
e did not attempt to model full and partial vaccination separately
ecause of the potential for misclassiﬁcation as discussed above.
. Results
.1. Cholera surveillance
From 2005 through 2012, surveillance identiﬁed 1540 suspected
holera cases. Testing was performed for 1161 (75%) of these cases,
nd V. cholerae O1 Ogawa or Inaba was isolated from 691 (60%) of
hose tested (Table 1). Cholera cases among camp residents were
etected in 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2010, and the incidence ranged
rom 0.7 to 10.7 cholera cases per 1000 refugees (Table 1). On-going
urveillance detected no cases in 2006, 2009, 2011, or 2012. The
hree largest outbreaks began in May  (2010), June (2005), and July
2007), coinciding with the start of the rainy season, and lasted
7–26 weeks (Fig. 1). The age and sex distribution of cases in each
f the three outbreaks followed a similar pattern: on average, adults
5–49 years old represented the largest proportion of cases (44%),
ollowed by children 5–14 years old (27%), younger children 1–4
ears old (18%), and ﬁnally adults ≥50 years old (10%); incidence
ates were highest among younger children and older adults (Fig. 2).
he majority of cases were male (58%, 57%, and 55% in 2005, 2007,
nd 2010, respectively) and incidence rates were higher among
ales of all ages with the exception of children 1–4 years old in
010 (Fig. 3). The 2008 outbreak was smaller (26 conﬁrmed cases),
able 1
aboratory testing and results for suspected cholera cases.
Year Tested by culture Not tested V. cholerae 
Negative Conﬁrmed Presumed
2005 80 194 320 O1 Ogawa 
2006* – – – – 
2007  110 114 59 O1 Inaba 
2008  81 26 0 O1 Inaba 
2009* – – – – 
2010  199 357 0 O1 Ogawa§
2011* – – – – 
2012* – – – – 
* No cholera cases were detected in 2006, 2009, 2011, or 2012.
** Conﬁrmed or presumed.
§ 356 cases of V. cholerae O1 Ogawa and 1 case of O1 Inaba detected.Fig. 2. Cholera cases (conﬁrmed or presumed) per 1000 refugees by age group for
years when outbreaks occurred. (No cholera cases were detected in 2006, 2009,
2011, or 2012).
began in late October, and lasted just six weeks. Across all four
outbreaks, 10 case-patients (two conﬁrmed, eight presumed) were
infants aged <1 year. Only one case (in 2010 in a pregnant woman)
was fatal, for an overall case-fatality proportion of 0.1%.
3.2. Camp population
At the time of the census, the camp population totaled 45,524
refugees, including 22,758 (50%) males, 1129 (2%) children <1
year old, and 4874 (11%) children 1–4 years old. Three-fourths of
refugees were ethnic Karen. The population lived in 7831 house-
holds, including 7797 private houses (median: 5 people per house)
and 34 boarding houses. Most (88%) houses had a private toilet,
usually pour-ﬂush pit latrines. Most (91%) toilet areas had water,
serogroup and serotype Population Cases** per 1000 refugees
48,174 10.7
47,731 –
46,613 3.7
38,724 0.7
38,916 –
43,459 8.2
47,978
48,283 –
C.R. Phares et al. / Vaccine 34 (2016) 128–133 131
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Table 2
Characteristics associated with no vaccination versus receipt of at least one dose.
Characteristic Prevalence ratio* (95% conﬁdence interval)
Age
1–14 years 1
15–64 years 1.5 (1.4–1.6)
≥65 years 2.0 (1.9–2.2)
Residency
≤5 years 1.1 (1.1–1.2)
6–10 years 1
≥10 years 1.3 (1.3–1.4)
Ethnicity
Karen 1.2 (1.1–1.3)
Other 1
* Adjusted for factors shown in the table plus sex and sex × age 15–64 years. Asso-
ciations with age were constant by sex but association with sex varied by age group.
In  stratiﬁed analysis adjusted for residency and ethnicity, male sex was  associatedig. 3. Cholera cases (conﬁrmed or presumed) per 1000 refugees during three large
utbreaks by age group and sex.
ut half (48%) lacked soap. A third (31%) of households reported
ollecting drinking water from less safe sources (private wells and
oreholes, water sellers, and natural springs, as opposed to chlori-
ated water supplied by an NGO).
.3. Vaccine registry
Eighty percent (29,032 out of 36,325) of refugees who  sought
accination brought their OCV cards to the campaign, where
he barcodes were scanned and their information updated with
ate, time, and vaccine status. The remaining 20% (7293) did
ot bring their OCV cards and were therefore issued temporary
ards. Among these 7293 temporary cardholders, 68% (4927) could
ot be matched to people in the census database. Most of these
nmatched temporary cardholders are likely represented in the
ensus database but unidentiﬁable due to complicating factors
uch as the transliteration of names, unknown birthdates, lack of
ddresses, and lack of ofﬁcial identiﬁcation numbers. Others are not
n the database including those who were absent during the census,
stablished residency after the census, or attended the campaign
s visitors.
.4. Vaccine campaign
Among 45,524 refugees living in Maela, 1129 children aged <1
ear and an estimated 910 pregnant women were not eligible for
accination, leaving a target population of 43,485 refugees. During
he 18 days of the campaign, 63,057 OCV doses were administered
s intended to the target population. Only 0.05% of refugees, mostly
hildren, spat out the vaccine on two consecutive attempts and thus
ould not be vaccinated. In addition, seven refugees unintentionally
eceived a third dose. The screening process identiﬁed 358 pregnant
omen and 709 infants <1 year old in round one, 240 pregnant
omen and 469 infants in round two, and 12 pregnant women
nd 21 infants in round three. None of the women who reported a
regnancy received vaccine but 21 infants inadvertently received
 single dose.
We  estimated ﬁrst dose coverage at 81% (minimum: 79%,
aximum: 83%) and second dose coverage at 64% (minimum:
2%, maximum: 66%). Coverage was higher for children (1–14
ears) and slightly higher for females; coverage was lowest
mong working-age (15–64 years) males. In multivariate models,
emaining unvaccinated (versus receiving at least one dose) was
ssociated with age ≥15 years, living in the camp for ≤5 years or
10 years, and Karen ethnicity (Table 2). Being unvaccinated was
lso associated with male sex (PR: 1.1; 95% CI: 1.1–1.2) but only
mong working-age adults. Factors not associated with vaccination
tatus included household size, socioeconomic status, exclusive use
f safe water, and markers of household hygiene.no  vaccination among adults 15–64 years (prevalence ratio: 1.1; 95% conﬁdence
interval: 1.1–1.2) but sex was not associated with no vaccination among children
1–14 years or adults ≥65 years.
3.5. Unused vaccine and wasted vaccine
MOPH purchased 90,000 doses for this campaign. As indicated
by vaccine vial monitors, all vials were maintained at an acceptable
temperature prior to use. A total of 64,078 vials were opened, of
which 993 (1.5%) were wasted. Among these 993 wasted doses,
297 were spit out. The remaining 696 vials cannot be accounted for
precisely, but hundreds were wasted when workers, in preparation,
pried the caps off vials that were then not consumed. Additional
explanations include miscounts and theft. MOPH used remaining
nearly 26,000 doses in other campaigns for migrant populations in
Thailand.
3.6. Adverse events following immunization
PU—AMI documented 84 refugees with 108 AEFI, most fre-
quently nausea (49%), dizziness (38%), and fever (30%), followed
by itchiness/rash (5%) or other symptoms (7%). As compared with
refugees 5–64 years old and adjusting for sex, AEFI were more
prevalent among children 1–4 years old (PR: 2.7; 95% CI: 1.6–4.5)
and adults ≥64 years old (PR: 2.9; 95% CI: 1.0–8.2, p < 0.05). No
AEFI were documented among the 21 refugees <1 year old who
were inadvertently vaccinated. Although not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, AEFI were more prevalent among females of all ages (PR: 1.6;
95% CI: 0.94–2.7; p < 0.09). Two serious adverse events required
inpatient hospitalization. One patient, a 50 year old woman, was
admitted for nausea, palpitations, and difﬁculty breathing the day
after ingesting her ﬁrst dose of vaccine. She was discharged 8 h later
with a diagnosis of anxiety. The other patient, a 21 year old woman
who was 3 weeks postpartum, was  admitted for self-reported fever,
cough, and tremor 2 days after ingesting her ﬁrst dose of vaccine.
She was treated with antibiotics and antianxiety medication and
released after three days. The third serious event was  a death in
a 73 year old homebound man  with a terminal illness. Although
visibly ill, the patient’s terminal condition was not known to the
mobile vaccination team at the time the vaccine was administered.
Following this event, vaccinators were retrained to seek guidance
from medical ofﬁcers before administering vaccine to ill people.
Upon investigation, none of the three serious adverse events were
judged to be caused by vaccination.
4. DiscussionRecent years have seen a resurgence of interest in vaccination
as a complement to traditional measures for cholera prevention.
Our results suggest that mass vaccination with a two-dose OCV
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n a refugee camp setting is feasible and AEFI are few. PU—AMI
as critical to success as this organization was already a familiar
nd trusted source for health information and services for Maela
efugees.
In deciding to conduct an OCV campaign in Maela, the MOPH
onsidered surveillance data indicating that cholera causes signiﬁ-
ant morbidity for the approximately 46,000 refugees living there.
ther factors included the perceived economic and political lim-
tations to improved water and sanitation. An international NGO
rovides clean water in Maela in accordance with Sphere stan-
ards [7]. However, many water sources of questionable quality
emain, including river water, boreholes and shallow wells, and
ommercial bottled water. Efforts to improve water and sanita-
ion in Maela, such as distribution of covered water containers with
aps and sand ﬁlters to treat turbid water sources, were undertaken
fter the 2007 and 2008 outbreaks. Although these measures likely
educed the risk of water-borne diseases, another cholera outbreak
ccurred in 2010. Additional improvements, such as construction of
nduring sanitary infrastructure including a waste-treatment facil-
ty, were not permitted because the camp is not intended to be
ermanent.
Ultimately, the MOPH determined the burden of cholera was
ufﬁciently high and the likelihood of imminent and adequate
mprovements to the sanitary environment sufﬁciently low to
arrant a vaccine intervention. ShancholTM was chosen in consid-
ration of its affordability and ease of administration as compared
ith Dukoral®. Because surveillance data indicate a cholera sea-
on from May  to November, the campaign was timed to occur in
he off season. Because past cholera outbreaks affected all ages and
oth sexes, vaccination was offered to the entire camp population
xcept for children <1 year and pregnant women. The manufac-
urer’s package insert does not recommend ShancholTM for use in
hese two groups citing a lack of safety and efﬁcacy data, although
he insert goes on to state that ShancholTM is, in theory, safe for the
etus and may  be considered for use in pregnant women [8].
The resultant campaign achieved high (81%) ﬁrst dose coverage,
 proportion similar to that reported elsewhere [9–11], but rela-
ively modest (64%) second dose coverage. Possible explanations
or lower second dose coverage include: communications after the
rst round to dispel rumors that vaccination would improve oppor-
unities for resettlement; an increase in competing activities during
he second round; routine migration out of the camp for seasonal
ork between rounds; and, as suggested by frequent complaints
uring the ﬁrst round, aversion to the taste. Working-age men
ere at greatest risk for remaining unvaccinated. As with other
nterventions and studies [12–14], we observed few AEFI. Better
nderstanding of barriers to second-dose uptake in general and
ptake among men  in particular, including qualitative assessments,
nd strategies to overcome those obstacles are needed.
Field studies have observed vaccine effectiveness of 78–79% up
o 14 months after vaccination [15,16] and a recent report sug-
ests that ShancholTM is 65% effective ﬁve years after vaccination
17]. We  have not yet been able to directly measure the effec-
iveness of the 2013 Maela campaign because no cholera cases
ave since occurred as of November 2015. Further complicating
n assessment of the impact of vaccination, surveillance data from
U—AMI outpatient clinics indicate that non-cholera watery diar-
hea declined from 9.6 to 5.7 cases per 1000 refugees from 2009
o 2014 (unpublished data), which could indicate water, sanita-
ion, or hygiene improvements during this period. In other words,
t is not clear whether the absence of cases since the 2013 is due
o the OCV intervention; general improvements in water, sanita-
ion, or hygiene; other factors; or a combination of factors. Cholera
urveillance, including weekly laboratory testing for a sample of
atery diarrhea cases, has been continuously maintained since the
ampaign and will continue for the foreseeable future. 34 (2016) 128–133
Two studies have observed an inverse relationship between
cholera risk for unvaccinated people and neighborhood cov-
erage [18,19], and simulated models of cholera transmission
predict substantial indirect protection for unvaccinated people
in highly endemic settings with just 50–70% coverage [20]. This
phenomenon may  provide indirect protection to unvaccinated
pregnant women  (and children <1 year); even so, excluding
pregnant women  from direct protection by vaccination, as was
done here, is concerning. Cholera during pregnancy is associated
with poor fetal outcomes, including fetal loss [21]. Indeed, in Maela,
the only fatal case was a pregnant woman. Data to support the use
of OCVs during pregnancy, or clearly establish a contraindication,
are wanted.
ShancholTM is only available in single-dose vials resulting in low
wastage but large volume. Although PU—AMI had sufﬁcient sup-
plies for routine immunizations, the cold chain requirements of
ShancholTM during transport, storage, and administration neces-
sitated procuring additional supplies and complicated campaign
logistics. As other investigators have concluded [22], improved
packaging and efforts to deﬁne the minimal cold chain require-
ments should be pursued. Other signiﬁcant remaining questions
included cost-effectiveness, length of protection (whether and
when to offer a booster dose or conduct future campaigns), and
the impact of population mobility on effectiveness.
More than a century ago, cholera was a major driver for the
sanitary revolution that reduced the risk of many enteric diseases
and overall mortality in many places [23,24] yet today many other
places with fewer resources are still burdened by diseases caused
by unsafe water and poor sanitation. Vaccination against cholera
rouses debate because it draws attention to these unacceptable
health disparities. OCVs address a small but highly visible part of
the spectrum of waterborne diseases and are recommended as a
complement to the traditional measures of safe water and adequate
hygiene. The documentation of ﬁeld experiences contributes to a
better understanding of the life-saving potential of cholera vaccina-
tion while identifying features that need improvement to optimize
delivery and impact.
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